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a b s t r a c t 
Using a unique panel dataset that contains comprehensive information about the relation- 
ships between a large bank and its credit card customers, we show that relationship ac- 
counts exhibit lower probabilities of default and attrition, and have higher utilization rates, 
than non-relationship accounts. Dynamic information about changes in the behavior of a 
customer’s other accounts at the same bank helps predict the behavior of the credit card 
account over time. These results imply that relationship banking offers signiﬁcant potential 
beneﬁts to banks: information the lender has at its disposal can be used to mitigate credit 
risk on the credit card account. 
© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
1. Introduction 
According to recent theories of ﬁnancial intermediation, one of a bank’s main roles is to serve as a relationship lender. 1 
Relationships offer banks comparative advantages in lending through the accumulation of private information, which can 
arise from the length of the relationship over time and its breadth across multiple products. In turn, relationships beneﬁt 
bank customers through increased credit availability, such as greater amounts of and lower prices for credit ( Boot and 
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1 Boot (20 0 0) provides an excellent review of the literature on relationship banking. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.02.005 
0304-3932/© 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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Thakor 1994 ). 2 Empirical studies of the beneﬁts of relationship banking have largely focused on the beneﬁts to customers, 
and corporate customers in particular. 3 
Only limited empirical research has been conducted on the beneﬁts of relationships to banks. In his review of relationship 
banking literature, Boot (20 0 0) concludes that “existing empirical work is virtually silent on identifying the precise sources 
of value in relationship banking.” Mester et al. (2007) study a sample of 100 Canadian small-business borrowers, and ﬁnd 
that information about customers’ collateral, and their inventory and accounts receivable in particular—which might not be 
available to banks outside of a relationship—is useful for loan monitoring. Also, changes in transaction account balances are 
informative about changes in this collateral. In subsequent work, Puri et al. (2017) provide external validation to our work 
and show that retail customers in Germany who have a relationship with their savings bank prior to applying for a loan 
default signiﬁcantly less often than customers with no prior relationship. 
This paper studies the economic beneﬁts of relationship banking to banks in the context of retail banking. 4 Credit cards 
provide a good setting for analyzing retail relationship banking, since it is easier to identify the information actually used 
by credit card issuers to manage their accounts. Speciﬁcally, our paper examines the implications of bank relationships 
for key aspects of credit card behavior, such as default, attrition, and utilization rates. 5 We use a unique, representative 
dataset of about 10 0,0 0 0 credit card accounts that are linked to information about other relationships account holders have 
with the bank that issued the card. Our dataset includes “public” credit bureau information that is available to all potential 
lenders, lenders’ “private” within-account (as opposed to cross-account) information about past behavior of the accounts at 
issue, and lenders’ “private” cross-account relationship information. Given the information used by banks to manage their 
accounts, this paper can more cleanly test whether additional information—in this case, relationship information—provides 
additional predictive power. 
The key contribution of this study is our use of cross-account relationship information to test whether a bank’s private 
information regarding the behavior of the other accounts held by a customer at the bank provides additional predictive 
power regarding the account at issue, such as credit card default, attrition, and utilization rates. One advantage of our paper 
is that the administrative panel data can help to measure an actual relationship along various dimensions. The cross-account 
relationship information is rich and comprehensive. It includes measures of the breadth of the relationships (number of 
relationships), the types of relationships (e.g., deposit, investment, and loan accounts), the length of the relationships (age 
in months), and the depth of the relationships (balances in dollars). Moreover, our data are longitudinal, so we can measure 
some relationship information that is inherently dynamic, such as high-frequency changes in the level and volatility of 
balances in other relationships. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst comprehensive analysis of relationships in the retail 
banking market. 
Previewing the main results, our paper shows substantial potential beneﬁts from relationship lending, through lower 
default risk, lower attrition, and increased utilization. Using Cox proportional hazard models, relationship information is 
found to signiﬁcantly help predict default and attrition, above and beyond all other variables used by the bank—i.e., both 
public information and private non-relationship information based only on the behavior of the credit card account. For 
example, for credit card accounts with at least one other relationship with the bank, the marginal probabilities of default and 
attrition are about 10% and 12% lower, respectively, than those of accounts without other relationships, ceteris paribus. More 
generally, beneﬁts to the bank tend to increase with various measures of the strength of the relationship (breadth, depth, 
and length). Further, explicitly dynamic information about changes in the behavior of account holders’ other relationships 
at the bank, such as changes in checking and savings balances, help predict the behavior of the credit card account over 
time. This suggests that one important advantage of relationships, in addition to other advantages that have been discussed 
in the literature, is that they can improve the monitoring of borrowers over time. Relationship banking is also associated 
with higher utilization rates. For instance, utilization rates for relationship accounts are 7 percentage points higher than 
non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. 
Previous literature has proposed several reasons why such relationship information can be informative, but it is diﬃcult 
to empirically distinguish between these explanations. Some emphasize the selection mechanism; for example, banks might 
be better at screening credit card applications by existing relationship customers. Or perhaps customers with multiple re- 
lationships differ from non-relationship customers in ways that are diﬃcult to observe, such as being wealthier or having 
higher perceived default costs. Our strategy is to apply the method of propensity score matching to control for selection 
on observables. The results from our matched sample are largely consistent with the main results in terms of directions 
and magnitudes. Moreover, relationship variables are not correlated with credit terms (APR and limit) or changes in bor- 
2 There can also be costs to relationship lending. For example, it can potentially create a “soft budget-constraint” problem, in which the customer 
exploits the relationship in bad times ( Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996 ). Relationship lending can also potentially create a 
hold-up problem, giving the bank an information monopoly that could allow it to price contracts on noncompetitive terms ( Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992 ; and 
Wilson, 1993 ). 
3 The literature that focuses on the beneﬁts of relationship banking for customers includes, but is not limited to, Billett et al. (1995), Slovin et al. (1993), 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Chakravarty and Scott (1999), Ongena and Smith (2001), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Yasuda (2005), 
Bharath et al. (2011), Ivashina and Kovner (2011) , and Kysucky and Norden (2016) . 
4 One exception is Puri and Rocholl (2008) , who analyze the importance of retail banking relationships to banks by examining cross-selling, and ﬁnd 
evidence that banks beneﬁt from an increase in both brokerage accounts and other retail products by their depositors. Agarwal et al. (2017) also study the 
role of relational contracts in the mortgage market. 
5 Attrition is account closing without default. 
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rowers’ FICO score in the 12 and 24 months after the lender issues the credit card. In addition, if relationship customers 
have higher perceived default costs, they would deliberately avoid default on their credit card debt to the lender, even when 
facing adverse economic shocks. Our strategy is to study a subsample that includes those accounts that experienced severe 
deterioration ex post in credit quality. The results show no signiﬁcant difference between the two groups in terms of default. 
Therefore, our results do not support the selection mechanism. 
Other explanations in the literature tend to emphasize more dynamic mechanisms related to information production 
over time and ongoing monitoring of loans. This implies that there are information beneﬁts to monitoring such relationship 
balances over time. We explore the dynamic information in our data to study the private information mechanism, and 
ﬁnd that changes in credit scores, declines in checking account balances, and transfers to and from checking and savings 
accounts predict default rates, attrition rates, and utilization rates. These results are consistent with the private information 
mechanism: Information the lender has on the dynamics of the relationship borrower’s other accounts can be used in some 
way to mitigate credit risk on the credit card account. 
Our paper adds to the literature in several ways. First, this study demonstrates the beneﬁts of relationship retail bank- 
ing. Previous studies suggest that the beneﬁt of relationship banking is through soft information developed over time in a 
relationship. For example, local banks have an information advantage when screening loans to higher risk borrowers based 
on unobservable soft information, which results in better loan outcomes ( Petersen and Rajan 2002; Agarwal and Hauswald 
2008 and 2010; Ergungor and Moulton 2014 ). Our paper shows that credit card borrowers’ other account activities with the 
same lenders can predict borrower defaults, attrition, and credit card utilizations, and suggests that the beneﬁts of relation- 
ship banking might arise from hard information instead of soft information. The paper is also related to economies of scope 
in retail banking with multiple ﬁnancial services. We show that private information generated by multiple ﬁnancial services 
offers another beneﬁt from a “supermarket” style of banking that leads to economies of scope. 
Second, this paper explores the richness and dynamics of our data to investigate the mechanisms of the beneﬁts of 
relationship banking. Our analysis shows that the observed results are not due to selection mechanism; instead, they support 
the private information mechanism. Norden and Weber (2010) ﬁnd that borrowers who default are likely to exhibit abnormal 
patterns in their checking accounts approximately 12 months before defaulting. Banks can use this information to predict 
future borrower defaults, and study results suggest that relationship lenders can beneﬁt the most from such information. 
Our results are consistent with Norden and Weber’s, suggesting that relationship lenders can beneﬁt from monitoring the 
dynamics of borrowers’ checking accounts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 discusses the empirical 
methodology and results, Section 4 analyzes possible explanations, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
This paper uses a unique proprietary panel dataset of credit card accounts with associated relationship information from 
a large national ﬁnancial institution. The dataset contains a representative sample of about 10 0,0 0 0 open accounts as of 
October 2001, which we follow monthly for the next 24 months. 
The dataset includes key information the bank uses to manage its credit card accounts, such as the main billing informa- 
tion listed on each account’s monthly statement, which includes total payments, spending, balances, and debt, as well as the 
credit limit and APR. It is important to distinguish between accounts characterized by revolving debt and accounts in which 
the borrower fully pays the outstanding balance each month. Since banks report the balance but not revolving debt to credit 
bureaus, observing revolving debt provides additional information about account holders’ credit risk. Our main speciﬁcation 
controls for debt to render our estimation of the effect of relationship more precise. 
The dataset also includes two key credit-risk scores for each account, which are lenders’ traditional summary statistics 
for the risk and proﬁtability of the account. The “external” credit score is the industry-standard FICO score, which is public 
information for all potential lenders and estimated based on available credit bureau data for each consumer. The “internal”
credit score is an account-speciﬁc behavioral score estimated by lenders using private, in-house information, and is only 
available three months after the credit card has been issued. Traditionally, that information has been limited to the behavior 
of the individual account in question and does not include other accounts or relationships the account holder has at the 
same bank. This is the case with our sample. Thus the two scores conveniently summarize the non-relationship (private 
within-account and public) information used by banks in managing credit cards. 
In addition to the external credit score, the dataset also includes the subset of the underlying credit bureau information 
the bank has directly collected from the credit bureaus: the total number of bankcards held by the account holder across all 
lenders and the cards’ balances and limits; number of and balances on other, non-bank credit cards (such as store cards); 
total balances and limits on home equity lines of credit (HELOCs); total mortgage balances (including both ﬁrst and second 
mortgages); and total balances on student loans and auto loans. Credit bureau variables are updated quarterly. 
These data are augmented by a number of other data sources. First, and most importantly for our purposes, the dataset 
was linked to a systematic summary of other accounts credit card account holders have at the bank. Speciﬁcally, the data 
contains information about the following types of deposit, investment, and loan relationships: checking, savings, CDs, mutual 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Non-relationship accounts Relationship accounts 
Mean Std Mean Std 
Unemployment rate 5.3 0.9 5.2 0.8 
% w/o health insurance 12.5 3.7 12.7 3.3 
State income $36,083 $4588 $36,428 $4507 
Application income $41,074 $12,627 $44,123 $16,029 
Wealth = low 32% 27% 
= medium 57% 55% 
= high 11% 17% 
External risk score 735 71 743 66 
Internal risk score 716 46 720 33 
Debt $1979 $3912 $1836 $3238 
Payments $308 $774 $389 $903 
Purchase $229 $923 $274 $669 
APR 16.99 5.46 15.50 5.08 
Credit line $8283 $3737 $9491 $3804 
Total number of bankcards 6 6 5 6 
Total bankcard credit limits $27,984 $24,902 $23,027 $27,639 
Total bankcard balances $7023 $14,066 $7569 $17,122 
Total number of non-bank cards 11 10 13 14 
Total non-bank card balances $18,553 $9324 $16,103 $7975 
Total home equity line amount $7394 $28,922 $5866 $25,241 
Total home equity line balance $4857 $18,651 $3909 $14,074 
Total mortgage loan balance $43,092 $81,893 $44,745 $87,208 
Total auto loan balance $3377 $6098 $2891 $6544 
Total student loan balance $1183 $6893 $1115 $7696 
Default 5.6% 3.9% 
Attrition 15.5% 12.0% 
Utilization 18.8% 23.9% 
Number of Accounts 40,944 43.7% 52,750 56.3% 
Notes : Values are averaged over the sample period. Dollar amounts in $10 0 0 units. Default 
and attrition rates are total rates over the sample period. 
funds, brokerage, mortgages, home equity loans (second mortgages), and HELOCs. 6 For each relationship type, the data 
includes the length of the relationship (age in months) and its depth (balances in dollars). This relationship information is 
updated monthly over the sample period. 7 
Second, credit data are augmented by macroeconomic and geographic-average demographic information based on each 
account holder’s location, including the state’s unemployment rate, average state income, fraction of people in the state 
who lack healthcare coverage, and local house prices. 8 Some of these variables are updated monthly, and others annually. 
The dataset also includes the self-reported level of account holder income, when available, from the account application; 
slightly less than half of the accounts in our sample include this variable. To avoid reducing sample size, a dummy variable is 
created to indicate when application income is missing, and in those cases the value of income is set to zero. Moreover, the 
dataset includes an account holder–speciﬁc estimate of wealth (based on marketing/geographic data and coded as “high,”
“medium,” or “low”) as of the time of account origination. 9 
The dataset includes open credit card accounts and accounts closed due to attrition or default. In the analysis, accounts 
that were closed before the start of the sample period in October 2001 are excluded; thus, our study sample only includes 
credit card accounts that were open as of the start of the sample period. Furthermore, to simplify our hazard analysis 
of account age, in the reported results only accounts that originated after October 1999 are included. Also, to focus on 
the effects of relationships and minimize potential endogeneity, for credit card account holders with other relationships, 
account holders who initiated new relationships in our sample period subsequent to opening the credit card account are 
also excluded. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key variables used below, averaged over the two years of the sample pe- 
riod. The table distinguishes “relationship accounts,” which have at least one other relationship (56% of the sample), and 
6 As noted previously, the dataset does not include several smaller relationships, such as student loans, personal loans, and auto loans. Thus our results 
represent a lower bound on the total possible value of relationships, though some of this information (student and auto loans) will be partly captured by 
the credit bureau data we use. 
7 The exception is that information on balances is not available for brokerage accounts. 
8 Unemployment and income data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use FHFA MSA-level house prices when available; otherwise, we use 
average prices for the state. In preliminary work, we also considered additional variables, such as the state divorce rate (which is not available for some 
states, such as California) and bankruptcy exemption levels in the state (which are subsumed by our state dummies). 
9 The dataset also includes some additional account-holder demographic data, such as age, marital status, and house ownership status. However, these 
demographic variables are sparsely populated, so we do not include them in our main speciﬁcation. Nevertheless, the main conclusions below are robust 
to including these variables. 
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“non-relationship accounts,” which have no other relationships (44%). Of the relationship accounts, 34% have one other re- 
lationship, and 24%, 19%, 11%, 8%, and 3% have two to six or more relationships, respectively. Among the accounts with one 
other relationship, 47% have a checking account, 29% a savings account, 12% a mortgage, and 12% a home equity loan or 
line of credit. No account has only a CD or mutual fund relationship; evidently, a customer typically opens an investment 
relationship only after establishing at least one other relationship. On average, relationship account holders have higher in- 
come and higher wealth. They also have less debt on their accounts and higher internal and external credit scores. Overall, 
based on public and private within-account information, relationship accounts generally appear to be less risky than non- 
relationship accounts. (Credit scores are calibrated such that higher scores correspond to lower probabilities of default.) Con- 
sistently, relationship accounts received higher credit limits and lower APRs. Turning to their performance over the sample 
period, relationship accounts do in fact have lower default rates, as well as lower attrition rates and higher utilization rates, 
on average. The open question is whether these results can be explained by differences in their other (non-relationship) 
characteristics, rather than by their relationships. 
3. Empirical results 
This section presents the empirical results on the effect of relationship banking on credit card default, attrition, and 
credit card utilization. 
3.1. Relationship banking and credit card default and attrition 
To test whether relationship banking can assist banks in assessing default and attrition risk for credit card loans, we 
estimate Cox proportional hazard models for default and attrition. 10 Default is deﬁned as going bankrupt or being three 
months delinquent, whichever comes ﬁrst. Attrition is account closing without default. 
The Cox model allows for a nonparametric baseline hazard rate, as well as potentially time-varying explanatory variables. 
The main speciﬁcation is the following Cox model: 
λ( t| X i ) = λ0 ( t ) e ( βX i ) (1) 
where βX i = β1 T im e t + β2 Stat e i + β3 MacroDemo g i,t−6 + β4 LoanPer formanc e i,t−6 + β5 Cr editBur ea u i,t−6 + β6 Relationshi p i,t−6 
and λ( t| X i ) is the hazard function for default or attrition of account i at time t with covariates X i . 
The main explanatory variables are grouped into six categories: Time t represents a complete set of month dummies, 
with one for each month in the sample period. State i represents a set of dummy variables that correspond to the state in 
which account holder i lives. MacroDemog i,t-6 represents macroeconomic and demographic characteristics, such as the local 
unemployment rate and account holder–speciﬁc estimates of income and wealth. LoanPerformance i,t-6 includes internal mea- 
sures of the performance of the sample credit card account over the sample period—including monthly purchases, payments, 
and debt—and the account’s credit limit, interest rate, and internal credit-risk score. CreditBureau i,t-6 represents the external 
credit score and other credit bureau variables, such as total balances on credit cards, HELOCs, and mortgages. 11 
Such variables have been studied before. For instance, using related duration models, Gross and Souleles (2002) show 
that external scores are powerful predictors of consumer default. Even given these scores, internal scores are also powerful 
predictors, which implies that credit card issuers’ private within-account information is valuable. Nonetheless, even given 
the two scores, macroeconomic and demographic characteristics are also predictive, albeit less so quantitatively. This result 
suggests that lenders do not necessarily use all potentially available information (perhaps due to regulatory or reputational 
concerns). 
The key innovation of this study comes in assessing the incremental predictive power of Relationship , which represents 
a broad array of measures of the account holder’s relationships. The baseline relationship measure labeled R1 simply uses a 
dummy variable to identify credit card account holders who have at least one other relationship at the bank at origination. 
(The omitted baseline category is non-relationship accounts.) R2 measures the breadth of the relationship, using dummy 
variables for the number of relationships (1–6 + , omitting 0 relationships). R3 focuses on the types of relationship, which are 
grouped into three broad categories (again using dummy variables): deposit relationships, investment relationships, and loan 
relationships. R4 identiﬁes the types of relationships more ﬁnely (eight categories): checking and savings accounts (deposit 
relationships); CDs, brokerage, and mutual fund accounts (investment relationships); and mortgages, home equity loans, and 
home equity lines (loan relationships). R5 measures the length of the relationships (age in months since opening) for each of 
the eight relationship categories separately. R6 combines the previous measures simultaneously. These relationship variables 
measure relationship breadth. 
This paper further measures relationship depth. R7 does this using the balance of each of the relationship categories 
(in addition to controlling for the presence of each relationship, as in R4). In an effort to distinguish more speciﬁcally 
the potential beneﬁts of relationships in the ongoing monitoring of loans, we also consider more dynamic relationship 
10 The results using a multinomial logit model were qualitatively similar. 
11 Unless stated otherwise, the time-varying variables in MacroDemog , LoanPerformance , CreditBureau , and Relationship are generally lagged by six months 
to minimize endogeneity, as in Gross and Souleles (2002) . For instance, by the time an account is three months delinquent, its credit score would have 
already declined sharply, essentially creating a mechanical relationship with the dependent variable. 
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Figure 1a Survival Curves for Number of Relationships 
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Figure 1b Survival Curves for Number of Relationships 
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Fig. 1. Survival curves for different numbers of relationships. 
Notes : (a) shows survival curves for different numbers of relationships. The horizontal axis shows the age in months since opening. The vertical axis shows 
the survival rate. (a) shows survival curves for (lack of) default. (b) shows survival curves for (lack of) attrition. 
information (controlling for the level and presence of balances using R4 and R7). R8 considers the effect of changes in the 
various types of balances (for convenience, between months t-6 and t-5 ). R9 considers the volatility of balances. (In light 
of the available sample period, it uses the standard deviation between t-1 and t-12 .) R10 uses instead the change in the 
volatility of balances (the standard deviation between t-1 and t-6 , minus the standard deviation between t-7 and t-12 ). R11 
focuses more speciﬁcally on checking balances, using an indicator for whether these balances have fallen below $2,0 0 0. 
In all speciﬁcations, standard errors are clustered to adjust for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation 
within accounts. 
This paper ﬁrst presents how baseline hazard rates from the Cox model vary with the number of relationships, without 
controlling for other covariates. Fig. 1 (a) shows the associated survival curves for (lack of) default, which are monotonically 
increasing with the number of relationships. For example, for accounts with just one other relationship, the probability of 
not defaulting within 48 months is about 96%. But for accounts with six or more relationships, that probability rises signiﬁ- 
cantly, to about 99%. Conversely, the probability of default monotonically declines with the number of relationships. Fig. 1 (b) 
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shows the analogous survival curves for (lack of) attrition. Again, the curves substantially and monotonically increase with 
the number of relationships. 
Our paper then estimates the full multivariate Cox model, following Eq. (1) , ﬁrst for default. We begin by brieﬂy 
discussing results for the non-relationship variables for our baseline speciﬁcation R1 (for brevity, reported in Appendix 
Table 1). Starting with credit variables, external and internal scores have negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. As expected, 
higher scores are predictive of lower probabilities of default. Marginal effects for continuous covariates like the scores show 
the effects of a one-standard-deviation increase in the covariates. A one standard-deviation larger external (internal) score 
is associated with a 15% (16%) reduction in the probability of credit card default relative to the baseline default rate, ceteris 
paribus. These are economically signiﬁcant effects. 
Many of the other credit variables are also signiﬁcant, though their marginal effects are much smaller. The probability 
of default signiﬁcantly increases with the amount of debt on the credit card account. It also increases with the number of 
credit cards held by the account holder (both bankcard and non-bankcard) and the balances on those cards. A larger credit 
limit or a lower APR on the account is associated with a lower probability of default. As discussed in prior literature, this 
likely reﬂects the endogeneity of credit supply: on average, issuers extended better credit terms to borrowers that were 
less risky; hence, the results for such covariates should not be interpreted as causal. For our purposes, it is conservative 
to control for such variables, since they are in the issuer’s (non-relationship) information set. Similarly for HELOCs, where 
one can also distinguish credit demand (balances) and credit supply (credit limits), larger balances are associated with more 
default, but larger limits are associated with less default. Other credit balances, where one cannot so readily distinguish 
credit supply and demand—such as mortgage balances—have negative coeﬃcients overall. In sum, public information from 
credit bureaus is predictive of default; even given this information, however, the bank’s private within-account information 
is also predictive. 
Turning to the macroeconomic-demographic variables, adverse local economic conditions are generally associated with 
more default. Higher local unemployment and lower house price growth are associated with signiﬁcantly higher default 
rates, even given the state and month dummies. A one-standard-deviation increase in unemployment (decrease in house 
price growth rates) corresponds to a 3% increase (8% increase) in the probability of default. Higher income and wealth are 
associated with less default, though these results are not statistically signiﬁcant. (This could reﬂect measurement error in 
these estimates of income and wealth. “Low-doc” accounts, for instance—for which income was not collected at the time 
of application—have signiﬁcantly higher default rates.) Overall, these (non-relationship) results are generally consistent with 
prior research ( Gross and Souleles, 2002 ). 
We now focus on results for relationship information. Given the large sample size, the coeﬃcients of all relationship 
measurements are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In the following discussion, only coeﬃcients and marginal effects 
will be discussed. The baseline relationship measure R1 simply uses an indicator variable for having another relationship; 
the omitted group is non-relationship accounts. According to the marginal effect, relationship accounts have a 10% lower 
probability of default than non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. This is an economically signiﬁcant effect (and larger 
than the marginal effects of all other covariates, with the exception of credit scores). Given the rich set of covariates, in- 
cluding both public information and the issuer’s private within-account information, this result demonstrates the predictive 
value of cross-account relationship information. 
Table 2 considers the other measures of relationships. Each horizontal panel in the table shows the results from the Cox 
model for separate speciﬁcations using each of the relationship measures R1–R11 separately. (For brevity, only relationship 
results are reported; for reference, the table repeats the results for R1.) R2 measures relationship breadth, according to the 
number of relationships. As in Fig. 1 , the probability of default signiﬁcantly and monotonically declines with the number 
of relationships. According to the marginal effects, the probability of default decreases by 2% for the ﬁrst relationship, and 
by 18% for the sixth (or more) relationship. R3 considers the effects of different types of relationships. The probability of 
default decreases by 14% with investment relationships, versus 9% for deposit relationships and 4% for loan relationships. 
R4 uses a ﬁner partition of relationship types. Within investment accounts, CD relationships have the largest (negative) 
marginal effects. All of the other relationship types also have signiﬁcant, albeit smaller, negative effects. R5 focuses on the 
length of the other relationships (age in months, distinct from the age of the credit card account, which is separately taken 
into account in the Cox model). For a one-standard-deviation increase in age, the probability of default decreases by 3%–
13%, with the largest effect arising from the age of a CD relationship. R6 simultaneously considers the previous measures 
of relationship, speciﬁcally relationship breadth, type, and length. The general pattern of results is similar to that described 
above. 
Overall, under all measures of relationships R1–R6, which measure relationship breadth, relationship accounts have lower 
probabilities of default. Similar measures of relationships have been considered in previous literature on corporate lending. 
This paper further measures relationship depth in R7, using ln (balances + $1). (The speciﬁcation also includes indicator 
variables for having the corresponding relationship, as in R4.) For all relationships, larger balances at the bank are associated 
with smaller probabilities of default. For asset balances, marginal effects range from 7% to 20%. Marginal effects are much 
smaller in magnitude for credit balances, though still negative. Recall that the speciﬁcation controls for total credit balances 
for each of the credit relationship types using credit bureau data, as well as (a more coarse measure of) wealth. Hence, these 
results can be interpreted as indicating that the larger the share of an account holder’s various balances at this particular 
bank, the lower the probability of default on the credit card from the bank. 
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Table 2 
Implications of relationships for default. 
Default 
Variable Coeff Std Err P -value Marg Eff
R 1. Relationship 
Relationship Indicator −0.3208 0.0859 < 0.0 0 01 10.1% 
R 2. Breadth of Relationships 
Number of Bank Relationships = 1 −0.2628 0.0356 < 0.0 0 01 1.6% 
= 2 −0.2307 0.0416 < 0.0 0 01 3.1% 
= 3 −0.3258 0.1270 < 0.0 0 01 6.3% 
= 4 −0.2539 0.1221 < 0.0 0 01 9.4% 
= 5 −0.6404 0.3151 < 0.0 0 01 10.6% 
= 6 + −0.6253 0.2465 < 0.0 0 01 17.9% 
R 3. Type of Relationships (Broad) 
Deposit Relationships −0.2410 0.0672 < 0.0 0 01 9.3% 
Investment Relationship −0.3366 0.1199 < 0.0 0 01 14.1% 
Loan Relationship −0.0303 0.0129 < 0.0 0 01 4.2% 
R 4. Type of Relationships (Narrow) 
Checking Dummy −0.1217 0.0391 < 0.0 0 01 6.6% 
Savings Dummy −0.2743 0.0697 < 0.0 0 01 8.0% 
Brokerage Dummy −0.2534 0.0891 < 0.0 0 01 10.5% 
CD Dummy −0.4579 0.1237 < 0.0 0 01 16.6% 
Mutual Fund Dummy −0.3714 0.0320 < 0.0 0 01 14.9% 
Home Equity Line Dummy −0.0162 0.0047 < 0.0 0 01 7.4% 
Home Equity Loan Dummy −0.0107 0.0047 < 0.0 0 01 2.8% 
Mortgage Loan Dummy −0.0167 0.0052 < 0.0 0 01 3.6% 
R 5. Length of Relationships 
Age of Checking Relationship −0.0013 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 3.4% 
Age of Savings Rel −0.0061 0.0 0 04 < 0.0 0 01 5.8% 
Age of Brokerage Rel −0.0108 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 9.8% 
Age of CD Rel −0.0213 0.0054 < 0.0 0 01 13.2% 
Age of Mutual Fund Rel −0.0163 0.0015 < 0.0 0 01 6.3% 
Age of Home Equity Line Rel −0.0 0 09 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 11.5% 
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel −0.0018 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 9.4% 
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel −0.0059 0.0021 < 0.0 0 01 10.0% 
R 6. Combined Relationship Measures 
Number of Bank Relationships = 1 −0.2551 0.0354 < 0.0 0 01 0.1% 
= 2 −0.2292 0.0409 < 0.0 0 01 1.8% 
= 3 −0.3129 0.1262 < 0.0 0 01 4.7% 
= 4 −0.2453 0.1200 < 0.0 0 01 7.0% 
= 5 −0.6307 0.3054 < 0.0 0 01 10.1% 
= 6 + −0.6189 0.2458 < 0.0 0 01 17.0% 
Checking Dummy −0.1169 0.0376 < 0.0 0 01 4.3% 
Savings Dummy −0.2573 0.0649 < 0.0 0 01 5.3% 
Brokerage Dummy −0.2417 0.0840 < 0.0 0 01 7.8% 
CD Dummy −0.4231 0.1195 < 0.0 0 01 13.1% 
Mutual Fund Dummy −0.3658 0.0308 < 0.0 0 01 11.7% 
Home Equity Line Dummy −0.0150 0.0045 < 0.0 0 01 4.2% 
Home Equity Loan Dummy −0.0098 0.0045 < 0.0 0 01 0.5% 
Mortgage Loan Dummy −0.0160 0.0048 < 0.0 0 01 0.7% 
Age of Checking Relationship −0.0012 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 2.6% 
Age of Savings Rel −0.0059 0.0 0 04 < 0.0 0 01 5.1% 
Age of Brokerage Rel −0.0108 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 8.9% 
Age of CD Rel −0.0212 0.0052 < 0.0 0 01 11.7% 
Age of Mutual Fund Rel −0.0156 0.0015 < 0.0 0 01 6.2% 
Age of Home Equity Line Rel −0.0 0 09 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 11.0% 
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel −0.0017 0.0 0 08 < 0.0 0 01 8.6% 
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel −0.0058 0.0021 < 0.0 0 01 8.8% 
State with Branch Indicator −0.2674 0.0749 < 0.0 0 01 3.0% 
Relationship ∗ State Branch −0.1222 0.0507 < 0.0 0 01 1.8% 
Checking Balance −0.0604 0.0137 < 0.0 0 01 12.5% 
Savings Balance −0.0720 0.0182 < 0.0 0 01 5.7% 
CD Balance −0.0749 0.0208 < 0.0 0 01 9.0% 
Mutual Fund Balance −0.1767 0.0421 < 0.0 0 01 18.4% 
Home Equity Line Balance −0.1147 0.0327 < 0.0 0 01 4.0% 
Home Equity Loan Balance −0.0788 0.0339 < 0.0 0 01 4.2% 
Mortgage Loan Balance −0.1974 0.0756 < 0.0 0 01 2.1% 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 2 ( continued ) 
Default 
Variable Coeff Std Err P -value Marg Eff
R 7. Depth of Relationships (ln(Bal) & R4) 
Checking Balance −0.0612 0.0139 < 0.0 0 01 13.2% 
Savings Balance −0.0731 0.0188 < 0.0 0 01 7.2% 
CD Balance −0.0780 0.0210 < 0.0 0 01 10.6% 
Mutual Fund Balance −0.1806 0.0433 < 0.0 0 01 19.8% 
Home Equity Line Balance −0.1173 0.0333 < 0.0 0 01 3.1% 
Home Equity Loan Balance −0.0817 0.0344 < 0.0 0 01 5.8% 
Mortgage Loan Balance −0.1984 0.0776 < 0.0 0 01 3.3% 
R 8. Change in Balances (ln(Bal) & R7 & R4) 
D(Checking Balance) −0.0307 0.0032 < 0.0 0 01 6.1% 
D(Savings Balance) −0.0285 0.0011 < 0.0 0 01 13.0% 
D(Mutual Fund Balance) −0.0655 0.0014 < 0.0 0 01 10.0% 
D(Home Equity Line Balance) −0.0042 0.0015 0.0 0 02 6.5% 
D(External Score) −0.4479 0.0262 < 0.0 0 01 16.0% 
D(Internal Score) −0.3854 0.0683 < 0.0 0 01 12.3% 
R 9. Volatility of Balances (sd(12) & R7 & R4) 
sd(Checking Balance) 1.1014 0.0209 < 0.0 0 01 5.2% 
sd(Savings Balance) 0.7945 0.0616 < 0.0 0 01 11.9% 
sd(Mutual Fund Balance) 1.2133 0.0638 < 0.0 0 01 10.2% 
sd(Home Equity Line Balance) 1.1366 0.0867 < 0.0 0 01 11.3% 
sd(External Score) 0.7706 0.2233 < 0.0 0 01 13.1% 
sd(Internal Score) 0.4569 0.2118 < 0.0 0 01 7.5% 
R 10. Change in Volatility (D(sd(6)) & R7 & R4) 
D(sd(Checking Balance)) 1.0136 0.0227 < 0.0 0 01 6.8% 
D(sd(Savings Balance)) 0.5563 0.0509 < 0.0 0 01 12.9% 
D(sd(Mutual Fund Balance)) 0.9448 0.0669 < 0.0 0 01 11.3% 
D(sd(Home Equity Line Balance)) 0.9608 0.0733 < 0.0 0 01 13.5% 
D(sd(External Score)) 0.5999 0.2104 < 0.0 0 01 14.9% 
D(sd(Internal Score)) 0.5903 0.2174 < 0.0 0 01 8.8% 
R 11. Low Checking Balances (& R7 & R4) 
Indicator(Balance < $20 0 0) 0.6999 0.1675 < 0.0 0 01 12.7% 
Controls Yes 
Number of Obs / Number Default 1,132,182 4322 
Notes : This table shows the effects of relationships in predicting credit card default 
(bankruptcy or three months delinquency), using Cox proportional hazard models fol- 
lowing Eq. (1) . Explanatory variables include macro-demographic, loan-performance, 
credit bureau and relationship variables, in addition to month and state dummies. 
The table reports only results for relationship variables; each panel represents a sep- 
arate speciﬁcation. (Other variables appear in the appendix for speciﬁcation R1.) R1 
is a dummy variable identifying credit card accounts that have another relationship. 
R2 uses dummy variables for the number of relationships (relationship breadth). R3 
and R4 use dummy variables identifying the types of relationships, broadly and nar- 
rowly deﬁned. R5 measures the length of the relationships (age in months since open- 
ing). R6 simultaneously considers previous measures of relationship, speciﬁcally re- 
lationship breadth, type, and length. R7 measures balances of the relationship cat- 
egories (relationship depth, using ln(balances + 1)), and R8 measures changes in the 
balances. R9 measures the volatility of balances over the prior 12 months, and R10 
measures changes in the volatility of balances over the two prior 6-month periods. 
R11 uses a dummy variable for whether checking balances have fallen below $20 0 0. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correla- 
tion within accounts. Marginal effects for continuous covariates show the effects of a 
one-standard-deviation change in covariates. 
To distinguish the speciﬁcally dynamic notions of the beneﬁts of relationships, the following speciﬁcations consider the 
dynamic measures of relationship information more explicitly. 
Relationship measure R8 focuses on the change in relationship balances (in addition to the level of balances from R7 
and indicators from R4), 12 and includes corresponding changes in external and internal credit scores. For a one-standard- 
deviation increase in relationship balance, the probability of default decreases by 6%–16%. These results demonstrate the 
value of relationships, and speciﬁcally in the ongoing monitoring of loans. R9 measures the volatility of balances across the 
12 Since our sample excludes relationships opened subsequent to the credit card account, these results are driven by changes in the intensive margin of 
balances. R8 does not include the (high-frequency) changes in CD and mortgage and home equity loan balances, since these mostly reﬂect interest and 
regular amortization, and so are a priori not as informative. 
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prior 12 months, and includes the volatility of credit scores: accounts with more volatile scores have higher probabilities of 
default (consistent with Musto and Souleles, 2006 ). In addition, more volatile relationship balances are also associated with 
higher default risk, with marginal effects ranging between 5% and 13%. R10 considers, instead, changes in the volatility of 
balances over the two previous six-month periods, and coeﬃcients are again signiﬁcantly positive. Increases in volatility are 
also associated with higher default risk. R11 uses an indicator for whether checking balances fall to a low level; here, below 
$20 0 0. Since the speciﬁcation also includes the overall level of checking balances (R7), this indicator reﬂects the discrete 
increase in risk associated with low balances per se. Low checking balances are associated with a 13% marginal increase in 
the probability of default. 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Eq. (1) instead for attrition, again focusing on relationship measures. (For 
brevity, non-relationship results are left to the appendix.) In general, the pattern of relationship results is qualitatively sim- 
ilar to that in Table 2 (and so our discussion of them will accordingly be brief). That is, the same relationship information 
associated with lower default rates is also generally associated with lower attrition rates. 
For example, using the baseline measure R1, relationship accounts have on average a 12% lower probability of attrition 
than non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. This result is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The effect on attrition 
is again monotonic with the number of relationships (R2), ranging from a 3% decline in attrition probability for the ﬁrst re- 
lationship to a 21% decline for the sixth relationship. The effect is signiﬁcant for all relationship types (R3 and R4), especially 
investment and deposit relationships. The probability of attrition signiﬁcantly declines with the length of the relationships 
(R5). Larger relationship balances (R7 and R11) and increases in relationship balances (R8) are also associated with lower 
attrition rates, but more (and increased) volatility in the balances is associated with higher attrition rates (R9 and R10). 
In sum, across the entire rich array of relationship measures in our data, including dynamic measures, relationship ac- 
counts have lower probabilities of default and attrition, ceteris paribus. 
3.2. Relationship banking and credit card utilization 
This section studies the implications of relationships on a standard measure of account usage, the account utilization 
rate (i.e., account balances relative to the account limit). For consistency, the same covariates are used as in Eq. (1) , but the 
dependent variable Y i,t is replaced with the utilization rate of account i in month t . 
13 The speciﬁcation is estimated using 
OLS, allowing for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within accounts. 
We begin by brieﬂy noting some of the results for non-relationship variables, which are shown in Appendix Table 3 for 
the baseline speciﬁcation using R1. Higher credit scores are correlated with lower utilization rates. This is not surprising, 
since the scores are known to take utilization into account negatively. Credit balances (total bankcard, non-bankcard, home 
equity line, mortgage, and auto balances, with the exception of student loan balances) come in with signiﬁcant negative 
coeﬃcients, which suggests some substitutability with balances on the sample credit cards, though the magnitudes of the 
effects are small. Higher unemployment is associated with signiﬁcantly greater utilization, though higher house price growth 
(and higher income) is also associated with signiﬁcantly greater utilization, which is indicative of a wealth effect. The effect 
of house prices is substantial: each percentage point increase in house price growth is associated with a 2.4 percentage 
point (p.p.) increase in the utilization rate. 14 
Table 4 reports results for the relationship variables. The coeﬃcient on relationship measure R1 is signiﬁcantly posi- 
tive; hence relationship accounts have higher utilization rates than non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. Relative to 
an average utilization rate of about 20 p.p., the average difference of 7 p.p. is substantial. 15 Using measure R2, utilization 
signiﬁcantly and monotonically increases with the number of relationships. The utilization rate is 2 p.p. higher for accounts 
with one other relationship, and 14 p.p. higher for accounts with at least six other relationships. Under measures R3 and R4, 
utilization increases with each type of relationship, especially checking and brokerage relationships (by about 9 p.p.). Under 
R5, utilization also increases with the length of each type of relationship. 
Using R7, coeﬃcients on relationship balances are signiﬁcantly positive. Hence, given total balances, larger shares of 
balances at the bank are associated with greater usage of the credit card from the bank. Using R8, changes in relationship 
balances also generally have positive effects. The notable exception is that an increase in HELOC balances has a signiﬁcant 
negative effect. This is consistent with a degree of substitutability between home equity lines of credit and credit card lines 
of credit. Under R9 and R10, higher (and increased) volatility of balances is associated with lower utilization. 
Under R11, given the level of checking balances (R7), the indicator for low balances is not signiﬁcant. More generally, 
various results regarding checking relationships imply that dynamic information from checking accounts in particular can 
be useful in the ongoing monitoring of loans. Changes in the behavior of checking accounts can provide indirect information 
about shocks and other factors that otherwise are hard for a bank to observe directly. 
13 Unlike Eq. (1) , the account limit and debt, payment, and purchase amounts are excluded as independent variables, since they are closely related to the 
dependent variable. 
14 This result, as well as the results for the other variables in the table, is similar using debt normalized by the limit as the dependent variable. 
15 The conclusion is the same using debt normalized by the limit as the dependent variable, even though unconditionally, relationship accounts have lower 
debt and higher limits than non-relationship accounts. For debt, the coeﬃcient on R1 is accordingly somewhat smaller at .033, but still statistically and 
economically signiﬁcant. 
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Table 3 
Implications of relationships for attrition. 
Variable Attrition 
Coeff Std Err P -value Marg Eff
R 1. Relationship 
Relationship Indicator −0.5607 0.0950 < 0.0 0 01 11.6% 
R 2. Breadth of Relationships 
Number of Bank Relationships = 1 −0.8552 0.0764 < 0.0 0 01 3.2% 
= 2 −0.7798 0.0696 < 0.0 0 01 3.8% 
= 3 −0.7196 0.0807 < 0.0 0 01 10.6% 
= 4 −0.9266 0.0968 < 0.0 0 01 14.6% 
= 5 −0.9731 0.1146 < 0.0 0 01 18.4% 
= 6 + −0.6895 0.0799 < 0.0 0 01 21.4% 
R 3. Type of Relationships (Broad) 
Deposit Relationships −0.1067 0.0474 < 0.0 0 01 11.3% 
Investment Relationship −0.2889 0.0396 < 0.0 0 01 13.3% 
Loan Relationship −0.2457 0.1294 < 0.0 0 01 7.8% 
R 4. Type of Relationships (Narrow) 
Checking Dummy −0.1537 0.0295 < 0.0 0 01 10.3% 
Savings Dummy −0.1251 0.0500 < 0.0 0 01 6.4% 
Brokerage Dummy −0.6333 0.0759 < 0.0 0 01 2.4% 
CD Dummy −0.2469 0.0764 < 0.0 0 01 5.7% 
Mutual Fund Dummy −0.1103 0.0698 < 0.0 0 01 12.6% 
Home Equity Line Dummy −0.2772 0.1006 < 0.0 0 01 5.0% 
Home Equity Loan Dummy −0.2178 0.0623 < 0.0 0 01 2.1% 
Mortgage Loan Dummy −0.2079 0.1172 < 0.0 0 01 1.2% 
R 5. Length of Relationships 
Age of Checking Relationship −0.0 0 04 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 5.0% 
Age of Savings Rel −0.0 0 05 0.0 0 03 < 0.0 0 01 5.9% 
Age of Brokerage Rel −0.0064 0.0016 < 0.0 0 01 5.5% 
Age of CD Rel −0.0 0 09 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 1.7% 
Age of Mutual Fund Rel −0.0 0 08 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 4.9% 
Age of Home Equity Line Rel −0.0014 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 3.5% 
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel −0.0015 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 1.7% 
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel −0.0021 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 0.9% 
R 6. Combined Relationship Measures 
Number of Bank Relationships = 1 −0.8500 0.0755 < 0.0 0 01 1.8% 
= 2 −0.7809 0.0693 < 0.0 0 01 2.0% 
= 3 −0.7103 0.0806 < 0.0 0 01 9.6% 
= 4 −0.9212 0.0952 < 0.0 0 01 13.9% 
= 5 −0.9648 0.1138 < 0.0 0 01 18.2% 
= 6 + −0.6864 0.0796 < 0.0 0 01 20.5% 
Checking Dummy −0.1535 0.0292 < 0.0 0 01 8.2% 
Savings Dummy −0.1246 0.0499 < 0.0 0 01 5.9% 
Brokerage Dummy −0.6256 0.0756 < 0.0 0 01 1.7% 
CD Dummy −0.2458 0.0751 < 0.0 0 01 5.3% 
Mutual Fund Dummy −0.1103 0.0687 < 0.0 0 01 11.8% 
Home Equity Line Dummy −0.2722 0.1005 < 0.0 0 01 4.9% 
Home Equity Loan Dummy −0.2146 0.0620 < 0.0 0 01 1.0% 
Mortgage Loan Dummy −0.2070 0.1162 < 0.0 0 01 0.6% 
Age of Checking Relationship −0.0 0 04 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 3.6% 
Age of Savings Rel −0.0 0 05 0.0 0 03 < 0.0 0 01 4.7% 
Age of Brokerage Rel −0.0064 0.0016 < 0.0 0 01 4.1% 
Age of CD Rel −0.0 0 09 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 0.9% 
Age of Mutual Fund Rel −0.0 0 08 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 3.2% 
Age of Home Equity Line Rel −0.0014 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 1.6% 
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel −0.0015 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 0.9% 
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel −0.0020 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 0.1% 
State with Branch Indicator −0.9645 0.0798 < 0.0 0 01 2.9% 
Relationship ∗ State Branch −0.8644 0.1034 < 0.0 0 01 1.4% 
Checking Balance −0.0240 0.0100 < 0.0 0 01 8.8% 
Savings Balance −0.0391 0.0139 < 0.0 0 01 5.5% 
CD Balance −0.0595 0.0158 < 0.0 0 01 5.0% 
Mutual Fund Balance −0.0497 0.0278 < 0.0 0 01 5.5% 
Home Equity Line Balance −0.0184 0.0209 < 0.0 0 01 5.5% 
Home Equity Loan Balance −0.0720 0.0495 < 0.0 0 01 5.6% 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 3 ( continued ) 
Variable Attrition 
Coeff Std Err P -value Marg Eff
Mortgage Loan Balance −0.1565 0.2358 < 0.0 0 01 1.1% 
R 7. Depth of Relationships (ln (Bal + $1) & R4) 
Checking Balance −0.0242 0.0101 < 0.0 0 01 9.3% 
Savings Balance −0.0392 0.0140 < 0.0 0 01 6.5% 
CD Balance −0.0601 0.0159 < 0.0 0 01 5.1% 
Mutual Fund Balance −0.0506 0.0283 < 0.0 0 01 5.9% 
Home Equity Line Balance −0.0187 0.0210 < 0.0 0 01 6.9% 
Home Equity Loan Balance −0.0724 0.0497 < 0.0 0 01 5.8% 
Mortgage Loan Balance −0.1596 0.2396 < 0.0 0 01 1.4% 
R 8. Change in Balances (ln(Bal) & R7 & R4) 
D(Checking Balance) −0.6195 0.0552 < 0.0 0 01 5.3% 
D(Savings Balance) −0.3557 0.0018 < 0.0 0 01 5.8% 
D(Mutual Fund Balance) −0.4797 0.1071 < 0.0 0 01 2.1% 
D(Home Equity Line Balance) −0.1510 0.0057 < 0.0 0 01 2.5% 
D(External Score) −0.8771 0.2081 < 0.0 0 01 13.5% 
D(Internal Score) −0.4872 0.2255 < 0.0 0 01 14.5% 
R 9. Volatility of Balances (sd(12) & R7 & R4) 
sd(Checking Balance) 0.8699 0.1779 < 0.0 0 01 12.4% 
sd(Savings Balance) 0.3015 0.0512 < 0.0 0 01 3.8% 
sd(Mutual Fund Balance) 0.8418 0.2345 < 0.0 0 01 3.1% 
sd(Home Equity Line Balance) 0.4405 0.1275 < 0.0 0 01 8.7% 
sd(External Score) 0.7632 0.2051 < 0.0 0 01 10.9% 
sd(Internal Score) 0.7232 0.3451 < 0.0 0 01 16.9% 
R 10. Change in Volatility (D(sd(6)) & R7 & R4) 
D(sd(Checking Balance)) 0.4981 0.0454 < 0.0 0 01 5.2% 
D(sd(Savings Balance)) 0.4 84 9 0.1062 < 0.0 0 01 14.4% 
D(sd(Mutual Fund Balance)) 0.7144 0.2951 < 0.0 0 01 11.7% 
D(sd(Home Equity Line Balance)) 0.7132 0.1934 < 0.0 0 01 11.9% 
D(sd(External Score)) 0.8707 0.1991 < 0.0 0 01 16.4% 
D(sd(Internal Score)) 0.9569 0.0943 < 0.0 0 01 12.8% 
R 11. Low Checking Balances (& R7 & R4) 
Indicator(Balance < $20 0 0) 0.5386 0.1412 < 0.0 0 01 13.0% 
Controls Yes 
Number of Obs / Number Attrition 1,132,182 12,649 
Notes : This table shows the effects of relationships in predicting credit card attrition, 
using Cox proportional hazard models following Eq. (1) . Explanatory variables include 
macro-demographic, loan-performance, credit-bureau, and relationship variables, in ad- 
dition to month and state dummies. The table reports only results for relationship vari- 
ables; each panel represents a separate speciﬁcation. (Other variables appear in the 
appendix for speciﬁcation R1.) Relationship variables are deﬁned in Table 2 . Standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within 
accounts. Marginal effects for continuous covariates show the effects of a one-standard 
deviation change in covariates. 
4. Possible explanations 
Our main results demonstrate that on average, relationship accounts exhibit lower probabilities of default and attrition 
and have higher utilization rates, compared to non-relationship accounts. Though results are consistent with the presence 
of relationship banking effects, multiple hypotheses could explain the above relations. There are two main explanations 
in the literature: the selection mechanism and the private information mechanism. This section conducts several tests to 
investigate these alternative explanations. 
The ﬁrst hypothesis is that our results could have been driven primarily by the selection mechanism. Speciﬁcally, two is- 
sues are associated with selection. The ﬁrst is whether the lender treated credit card applications differently at origination. If 
the lender was in fact using cross-account information (relationships) in its underwriting decisions by offering better credit 
card terms, such as lower APRs or higher credit limits, to customers (borrowers) with prior relationships, we should not 
be surprised to observe different behaviors in using credit cards between relationship and non-relationship accounts. The 
unconditional summary statistics in Table 1 report a lower average APR and higher credit line limit for relationship accounts 
relative to non-relationship accounts, indicating that the lender might use relationship information in its underwriting de- 
cisions. To address this issue, our strategy is to estimate empirical speciﬁcations with the credit card’s APR and credit line 
limit when the account was opened as dependent variables and a set of variables used in the lender’s underwriting process 
as independent variables. The relationship variable is also included in the regressions to test whether it plays a signiﬁcant 
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Table 4 
Implications of relationships for utilization. 
Variable Utilization rate 
Coeff Std Err P -value 
R 1. Relationship 
Relationship Indicator 0.0680 0.0109 < 0.0 0 01 
R 2. Breadth of Relationships 
Number of Bank Relationships = 1 0.0241 0.0027 < 0.0 0 01 
= 2 0.0292 0.0029 < 0.0 0 01 
= 3 0.0517 0.0029 < 0.0 0 01 
= 4 0.0690 0.0030 < 0.0 0 01 
= 5 0.0954 0.0031 < 0.0 0 01 
= 6 + 0.1378 0.0031 < 0.0 0 01 
R 3. Type of Relationships (Broad) 
Deposit Relationships 0.0730 0.0012 < 0.0 0 01 
Investment Relationship 0.1032 0.0011 < 0.0 0 01 
Loan Relationship 0.0324 0.0073 < 0.0 0 01 
R 4. Type of Relationships (Narrow) 
Checking Dummy 0.0931 0.0011 < 0.0 0 01 
Savings Dummy 0.0576 0.0013 < 0.0 0 01 
Brokerage Dummy 0.0930 0.0025 < 0.0 0 01 
CD Dummy 0.0755 0.0017 < 0.0 0 01 
Mutual Fund Dummy 0.0297 0.0027 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Line Dummy 0.0484 0.0026 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Loan Dummy 0.0334 0.0030 < 0.0 0 01 
Mortgage Loan Dummy 0.0373 0.0089 < 0.0 0 01 
R 5. Length of Relationships 
Age of Checking Relationship 0.0 0 02 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Savings Rel 0.0 0 03 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Brokerage Rel 0.0 0 07 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of CD Rel 0.0 0 01 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Mutual Fund Rel 0.0 0 09 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Home Equity Line Rel 0.0 0 07 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel 0.0 0 01 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel 0.0 0 03 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
R 6. Combined Relationship Measures 
Number of Bank Relationships = 1 0.0230 0.0026 < 0.0 0 01 
= 2 0.0290 0.0027 < 0.0 0 01 
= 3 0.0490 0.0028 < 0.0 0 01 
= 4 0.0662 0.0028 < 0.0 0 01 
= 5 0.0935 0.0030 < 0.0 0 01 
= 6 + 0.1368 0.0029 < 0.0 0 01 
Checking Dummy 0.0910 0.0011 < 0.0 0 01 
Savings Dummy 0.0563 0.0013 < 0.0 0 01 
Brokerage Dummy 0.0871 0.0024 < 0.0 0 01 
CD Dummy 0.0722 0.0016 < 0.0 0 01 
Mutual Fund Dummy 0.0289 0.0025 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Line Dummy 0.0462 0.0025 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Loan Dummy 0.0318 0.0029 < 0.0 0 01 
Mortgage Loan Dummy 0.0349 0.0087 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Checking Relationship 0.0 0 02 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Savings Rel 0.0 0 03 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Brokerage Rel 0.0 0 07 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of CD Rel 0.0 0 01 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Mutual Fund Rel 0.0 0 09 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Home Equity Line Rel 0.0 0 06 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Home Equity Loan Rel 0.0 0 01 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
Age of Mortgage Loan Rel 0.0 0 03 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
State with Branch Indicator 0.0456 0.0031 < 0.0 0 01 
Relationship ∗ State Branch 0.0436 0.0033 < 0.0 0 01 
Checking Balance 0.0331 0.0 0 04 < 0.0 0 01 
Savings Balance 0.0824 0.0 0 05 < 0.0 0 01 
CD Balance 0.0228 0.0 0 05 < 0.0 0 01 
Mutual Fund Balance 0.0225 0.0 0 07 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Line Balance 0.0573 0.0 0 06 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Loan Balance 0.0140 0.0022 < 0.0 0 01 
Mortgage Loan Balance 0.0636 0.0080 < 0.0 0 01 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table 4 ( continued ) 
Variable Utilization rate 
Coeff Std Err P -value 
R 7. Depth of Relationships (ln (Bal + $1) & R4) 
Checking Balance 0.0341 0.0 0 04 < 0.0 0 01 
Savings Balance 0.0822 0.0 0 05 < 0.0 0 01 
CD Balance 0.0231 0.0 0 05 < 0.0 0 01 
Mutual Fund Balance 0.0231 0.0 0 07 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Line Balance 0.0594 0.0 0 07 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Loan Balance 0.0138 0.0023 < 0.0 0 01 
Mortgage Loan Balance 0.0652 0.0080 < 0.0 0 01 
R 8. Change in Balances (ln(Bal) & R7 & R4) 
D(Checking Balance) 0.0185 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
D(Savings Balance) 0.0162 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
D(Mutual Fund Balance) 0.0029 0.0 0 03 < 0.0 0 01 
D(Home Equity Line Balance) −0.0175 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
D(External Score) 0.0178 0.0089 < 0.0 0 01 
D(Internal Score) 0.0200 0.0077 < 0.0 0 01 
R 9. Volatility of Balances (sd(12) & R7 & R4) 
sd(Checking Balance) −0.0157 0.0018 < 0.0 0 01 
sd(Savings Balance) −0.0338 0.0023 < 0.0 0 01 
sd(Mutual Fund Balance) −0.0631 0.0 0 09 < 0.0 0 01 
sd(Home Equity Line Balance) −0.0240 0.0051 < 0.0 0 01 
sd(External Score) −0.0161 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
sd(Internal Score) −0.0560 0.0243 < 0.0 0 01 
R 10. Change in Volatility (D(sd(6)) & R7 & R4) 
D(sd(Checking Balance)) −0.0 0 04 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
D(sd(Savings Balance)) −0.0 0 02 0.0 0 03 < 0.0 0 01 
D(sd(Mutual Fund Balance)) −0.0030 0.0 0 02 < 0.0 0 01 
D(sd(Home Equity Line Balance)) −0.0 0 04 0.0 0 0 0 < 0.0 0 01 
D(sd(External Score)) −0.0012 0.0015 < 0.0 0 01 
D(sd(Internal Score)) −0.0 0 07 0.0 0 01 < 0.0 0 01 
R 11. Low Checking Balances (& R7 & R4) 
Indicator(Balance < $20 0 0) −0.0567 0.0590 0.8322 
Controls Yes 
Number of Obs 1,132,182 
Notes : This table shows the effects of relationships on credit card utiliza- 
tion rates (balances/limit), estimating Eq. (1) by OLS. Explanatory vari- 
ables include macro-demographic, loan-performance, credit-bureau, and 
relationship variables, in addition to month and state dummies. The ta- 
ble reports only results for relationship variables; each panel represents a 
separate speciﬁcation. (Other variables appear in the appendix for speci- 
ﬁcation R1.) Relationship variables are deﬁned in Table 2 . Standard errors 
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation 
within accounts. 
role in determining credit terms (APR and limit). Results are reported in Appendix Table 4. Coeﬃcients of the relationship 
variable are insigniﬁcant in both regressions, implying that the bank was not using cross-account information to set credit 
terms. 
The second issue associated with selection is the effect of relationship banking as a reﬂection of self-selection. If a bor- 
rower who deals primarily with one bank is intrinsically less risky than a borrower who deals with multiple banks, or 
if credit card offerings with inferior credit terms are more likely to attract risky borrowers without a prior relationship 
with the issuer, the better performance of relationship accounts relative to non-relationship accounts cannot be attributed 
to the banking relationship. Instead, the difference in performance between relationship borrowers and non-relationship 
borrowers is linked to their riskiness at origination. To investigate the presence of a self-selection effect, our strategy is 
to use propensity-score matching to control for selection on observables and use changes in borrowers’ credit score af- 
ter credit card issuance to study selection on unobservables. First, a matched sample is constructed using propensity-score 
matching to ensure that the group of relationship accounts is paired with a comparable group of non-relationship accounts. 
Matched non-relationship accounts are selected by the nearest-neighbor algorithm without replacement, based on the com- 
puted propensity scores. We ﬁrst test whether relationship and non-relationship accounts are comparable. Compared to 
non-relationship accounts, relationship accounts in the matched sample have similar APRs and credit limits. Moreover, there 
is little difference in the matched account’s characteristics and his or her creditworthiness, as represented by FICOs. Overall, 
relationship and non-relationship accounts are mostly comparable to each other. The results of propensity score matching 
are shown in Table 5 . For relationship accounts, the marginal probabilities of default and attrition are about 12% and 13% 
lower, respectively, than those of accounts without other relationships, ceteris paribus. Relationship accounts have a 7 per- 
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Table 5 
Propensity score matching. 
Relationship variable Default Attrition Utilization rate 
Coeff P -value Marg Eff Coeff P -value Marg Eff Coeff SE P -value 
R 1. Any Relationship 
Relationship Indicator −0.318 0.0 0 04 12% −0.599 < 0.0 0 01 13% 0.070 0.010 < 0.0 0 01 
R 2. Breadth (#) of Relations 
1 −0.243 < 0.0 0 01 4% −0.817 < 0.0 0 01 3% 0.023 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
2 −0.220 < 0.0 0 01 6% −0.753 < 0.0 0 01 5% 0.027 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
3 −0.317 0.0 0 0 10% −0.704 < 0.0 0 01 11% 0.052 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
4 −0.256 0.0 0 0 12% −0.901 < 0.0 0 01 16% 0.068 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
5 −0.650 0.028 16% −0.966 < 0.0 0 01 17% 0.097 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
6 + −0.599 0.028 19% −0.628 < 0.0 0 01 22% 0.134 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
R 3. Type of Relations (Broad) 
Deposit Relationships −0.226 < 0.0 0 01 10% −0.108 < 0.0 0 01 12% 0.072 0.001 < 0.0 0 01 
Investment −0.327 < 0.0 0 01 21% −0.278 < 0.0 0 01 13% 0.098 0.001 < 0.0 0 01 
Loan −0.031 < 0.0 0 01 5% −0.230 < 0.0 0 01 9% 0.032 0.007 < 0.0 0 01 
R 4. Type of Relations (Narrow) 
Checking −0.115 < 0.0 0 01 7% −0.144 < 0.0 0 01 10% 0.094 0.001 < 0.0 0 01 
Savings −0.267 < 0.0 0 01 12% −0.127 < 0.0 0 01 7% 0.055 0.001 < 0.0 0 01 
Brokerage −0.240 <0.0 0 01 16% −0.634 < 0.0 0 01 2% 0.087 0.002 < 0.0 0 01 
CD −0.441 < 0.0 0 01 22% −0.227 < 0.0 0 01 6% 0.068 0.002 < 0.0 0 01 
Mutual Fund −0.360 < 0.0 0 01 20% −0.100 < 0.0 0 01 13% 0.028 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Line −0.015 < 0.0 0 01 8% −0.272 < 0.0 0 01 5% 0.046 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
Home Equity Loan −0.010 < 0.0 0 01 2% −0.200 < 0.0 0 01 2% 0.033 0.003 < 0.0 0 01 
Mortgage Loan −0.016 < 0.0 0 01 3% −0.200 < 0.0 0 01 3% 0.035 0.009 < 0.0 0 01 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Obs 837,212 837,212 837,212 
Note : This table shows the effects of relationships on credit card default, attrition, and utilization rates (balances/limit), estimating 
Eq. (1) with the method of propensity score matching. Explanatory variables include macro-demographic, loan-performance, credit- 
bureau, and relationship variables, in addition to month and state dummies. The table reports only results for relationship variables 
R1–R4; each panel represents a separate speciﬁcation. Relationship variables are deﬁned in Table 2 . Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity across accounts and serial correlation within accounts. 
centage points higher utilization rate than non-relationship accounts, ceteris paribus. Results from the matched sample are 
largely consistent with the main results in terms of directions and magnitudes. In other relationship measures, relationship 
accounts also have lower default and attrition, but higher utilization rates compared to accounts without other relationships. 
These results suggest that our results are unlikely to be due to selection. 
Although a matching approach is used to ensure that the relationship and non-relationship groups are comparable, selec- 
tion can also be an unobserved risk type. To address this issue, our strategy is to run a second test by comparing changes in 
accounts’ credit quality, after booking, between borrowers with and without prior relationships with the bank. Speciﬁcally, 
our analysis assesses the extent to which a borrower’s FICO score changed in the 12 and 24 months after the lender issued 
the credit card to the borrower. The FICO score measures the relative credit quality of an individual account (given that a 
FICO score comes from credit bureaus and reﬂects the account holder’s credit and debt repayment activities across all credit 
products he/she holds, it can be informative regarding the extent to which the borrower faced adverse economic hardships 
that hindered his/her ability to make the minimum payment on other held credit cards or other loans). The FICO score is 
also not related to the borrower’s relationship with the lender (or other lenders). If non-relationship accounts are inherently 
more risky than relationship accounts in our sample, there should be a more severe deterioration ex post in the credit qual- 
ity (FICO score) of non-relationship accounts relative to relationship accounts. Appendix Table 5 reports regression results 
on changes in FICO scores of accounts at 12 and 24 months after origination. The results show that between the relationship 
and non-relationship account groups, changes in FICO scores at 12 or 24 months subsequent to origination remain similar. 
Hence, there was no (economically or statistically) signiﬁcant deterioration in the credit quality of non-relationship accounts 
relative to relationship accounts. These results also fail to support a self-selection effect. 
Another type of selection might be the higher perceived default costs associated with relationship accounts. Borrowers 
with prior relationships are more likely to build loyalty for the lender, and thus become more reluctant to default on credit 
card debt. Alternatively, borrowers with prior relationships may believe that defaulting on credit card debt is more costly 
when the lender also holds some of their other debt and/or assets, as they are perhaps fearful that in the event of a 
default, the lender would have much more information about their balance sheets, and thus would be more likely to obtain 
successful deﬁciency judgments. If relationship accounts have higher perceived default costs compared to non-relationship 
accounts, relationship accounts would deliberately avoid default on their credit card debt with the lender, even when facing 
adverse economic/ﬁnancial shocks. With this reasoning, we construct a subsample that includes accounts that experienced 
severe deterioration ex post in credit quality. For our analysis, an account is deﬁned to experience severe deterioration ex 
post if the FICO score dropped by 50 points, controlling for initial FICO scores. In this subsample, our analysis compares 
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the difference in default probabilities between relationship and non-relationship accounts. Appendix Table 6 presents the 
results. The results show no signiﬁcant difference between the two groups. The evidence suggests that no higher perceived 
default costs are associated with relationship accounts. 
This paper also explores our data’s dynamic information to study the private information mechanism. Our panel data can 
measure some relationship information that is inherently dynamic, such as high-frequency changes in the level and volatility 
of the balances in other relationships. In our analysis of dynamic information (R8–R10), changes in credit scores, declines 
in checking account balances, and transfers to and from checking and savings accounts predict default rates, attrition rates, 
and utilization rates. These results are consistent with the private information mechanism: information the lender has at 
its disposal on the dynamics of the relationship borrower’s other accounts can be used to mitigate credit risk on the credit 
card account. Our dataset does not have measures that identify lenders’ direct interventions after observing these changes 
in borrowers’ other accounts. In practice, when banks observe that a borrower’s credit score drops suddenly, they might 
raise the interest rate, cut the credit line, or even freeze the credit line. Typical credit card contracts specify that if credit 
quality changes, the lender has the discretion to alter the pricing and quantity of credit. There are relevant examples in 
the CFPB credit card agreement database. 16 For instance, the Bank of America’s credit card agreement says, “We reserve the 
right to amend this Agreement at any time.” Reasons include “changes related to your individual credit history, such as: 
your risk proﬁle, your payment or transaction patterns, balance patterns, the utilization levels of this and other accounts, 
credit bureau information including the age, history and type of other accounts, and the measure of risk associated with 
each.” We veriﬁed this with the lender of our data which conﬁrmed that it will alter contract terms upon deterioration in 
credit scores at its discretion. 
In sum, the observed results are not due to selection or higher perceived default costs, but rather are consistent with 
a monitoring explanation. Information the lender has at its disposal on the dynamics of the relationship borrower’s other 
accounts can be used to mitigate credit risk on the credit card account. 
5. Conclusion 
This study provides direct evidence of the potential beneﬁts of relationship banking to retail banks. Results indicate that, 
even controlling for traditional sources of bank information (both public information and private, within-account informa- 
tion) and other variables, credit card account holders with other relationships at a bank tend to have higher utilization 
rates and lower default and attrition rates. In particular, dynamic information about changes in the behavior of an account 
holder’s other relationships helps predict the behavior of the credit card account over time. This is consistent with the 
view that, as one of the potential beneﬁts of relationship banking, relationships can help banks better monitor their loans 
over time. We show that the observed results are not due to selection or higher perceived default costs. They are, however, 
consistent with a monitoring explanation: Information the lender has at its disposal on the dynamics of the relationship 
borrower’s other accounts can be used to mitigate credit risk on the credit card account. 
These results imply that relationship information is valuable in a predictive sense, but exactly how banks should use this 
information requires additional consideration. The optimal use of information and optimal contract design, both from the 
bank’s point of view and socially, is an important but diﬃcult question that is beyond the scope of this paper. First, banks 
must consider how consumers and their competitors would respond to use of the information. Second, government policies 
can restrict the use of certain information, including cross-account information. In addition to considering the beneﬁts of 
such restrictions, a comprehensive analysis of such policies should also consider the potential eﬃciency loss from excluding 
information that is predictive. 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2018.02. 
005 . 
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